

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 06130

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (F O R P A R A 3)

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: US/USSR/UK NPT REVCON CONSULTATIONS

SUMMARY. U.S., USSR AND UK REPS. HELD USEFUL DISCUSSIONS APRIL 21 ON GENERAL AND PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS RELATING TO NPT REVCON AND ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON ARTICLE BY ARTICLE BASIS. APRIL 22 DEVOTED TO MOLDING DRAFT DECLARATIONS CIRCULATED BY EACH DEL. (SEE SEPTTEL). THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT ON MOST MATTERS, AND, IN PARTICULAR ON NEED TO RESIST AMENDMENT OF TREATY OR INDIRECT AMENDMENTS BY PROTOCOLS. MAJOR DIFFERENCES INVOLVED UK PNE COMMITTEE PROPOSAL AND QTB INITIATIVE.

1. SOVIET DEL. HEADED BY ISRAELYAN AND INCLUDING TIMERBAEV, SHMELOV, KRASHULIN AND TWO EMBOFFS MET WITH UK
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DEL. HEADED BY THOMSON (FCO) AND INCLUDING EDMONDS (FCO)

WHITE (CCD), PANTON (MOD) AND U.S. DEL. HEADED BY KLEIN (ACDA) WITH VAN DOREN (ACDA), NOSENZO AND KELLY (STATE), THOMPSON (ERDA) AND EMBOFF.

2. AFTER WELCOME BY THOMSON, ISRAELYAN READ PART OF STATEMENT TO WHICH HE REFERRED SEVERAL TIMES DURING DISCUSSIONS. SOME OF STATEMENT TRACKED TEXT OF PAPER CIRCULATED RECENTLY BY SOVIETS TO A NUMBER OF NNWS PARTIES TO NPT. HE NOTED FINAL DOCUMENT OF REVCON WOULD BE VERY IMPORTANT AND THAT SOVIETS HAD A DRAFT TO CIRCULATE. HE REFERRED TO STRONG SOVIET SUPPORT FOR NPT AND CITED REFERENCES TO IMPORTANT ROLE OF TREATY IN BREZHNEV SPEECH AND VERY RECENT SOVIET -- IRAQI COMMUNIQUE. ISRAELYAN SAID SOVIETS HAD BEEN ACTIVE ON EVE OF REVCON AND NOTED FOLLOWING:

(A) THEY HAD RECENTLY PRESSED AT FORMIN LEVEL FOR ITALY, FRG AND JAPAN TO JOIN TREATY. ASSESSMENT WAS THAT EC NNWS MIGHT DO SO BEFORE OR DURING REVCON BUT THAT JAPAN UNLIKELY TO DO SO.

(B) SOVIETS HAD CALLED IN ABOUT 50 AMBASSADORS FOR CONSULTATIONS AND PRESENTATION OF SOVIET VIEWS ON REVCON MATTERS AND STRESSED "INADMISSABILITY" OF TREATY REVISION.

(C) SOCIALIST COUNTRIES (USSR, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, BULGARIA, HUNGARY, POLAND, ROMANIA, GDR AND MONGOLIA) HAD HELD MEETING APRIL 17-18 OF DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTERS AT BRATISLAVA TO DISCUSS REVCON MATTERS. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT ON ISSUES, WITH ROMANIA EXPRESSING SOME DIFFERENT VIEWS, BUT STATING THAT IT WOULD OPPOSE MODIFICATION OF THE TREATY.

3. KLEIN WELCOMED MEETING AND LOOKED FORWARD TO CONTINUING CONSULTATION AMONG DEPOSITARY POWERS DURING REVCON, ALTHOUGH IT WAS IMPORTANT TO AVOID IMPRESSION OF NWS COLLUSION. THOMSON INDICATED PRESS INQUIRIES HAD BEEN RECEIVED ABOUT TRILATERAL MEETING AND CIRCULATED SHORT DRAFT PRESS RELEASE WHICH STATED ONLY THAT DEPOSITARY CONFIDENTIAL

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POWERS WERE DISCUSSING REVCON. IT WAS AGREED TO USE THE STATEMENT ONLY IF NECESSARY. ON STATUS OF EC NNWS, HE SAW BETTER THAN EVEN CHANCE OF ITALIAN RATIFICATION BY MAY 5 OR SOON THEREAFTER. HE WAS NOT SO OPTIMISTIC ABOUT JAPANESE RATIFICATION BY TIME OF REVCON. SOVIETS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THEY WOULD SUPPORT CREATION OF ADDITIONAL VICE-PRESIDENCIES FOR UP TO TWO EURATOM MEMBERS AND FOR JAPAN IF RATIFICATIONS DEPOSITED BY MAY 5.

4. DISCUSSION TURNED TO VARIOUS GENERAL AND PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS. ISRAELYAN NOTED SOVIET BLOC COUNTRIES HAD AGREED ON WHICH OFFICES THEY WOULD SEEK AT REVCON AND LISTED BREAKDOWN. SOVIET DELEGATION WOULD BE HEADED BY AS YET UNSELECTED INDIVIDUAL AT DEPUTY MINISTER LEVEL (FYI: PROBABLY KUZNETSOV) AND WOULD CONSIST OF 10 TO 15 MEMBERS. HE AGREED DEPOSITARIES SHOULD MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTACT. HE STRONGLY OPPOSED AMENDMENTS TO TREATY OR PROTOCOLS AND DID NOT WANT REVCON TO TAKE DECISION ABOUT SCHEDULING FURTHER REVCONS.

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5. KLEIN DISCUSSED ROC ISSUE AND OUTLINED U.S. POSITION.
ROC HAD INDICATED IT WOULD NOT ATTEND CONFERENCE PROVIDED

NO ONE WOULD CHALLENGE ROC TREATY STATUS. KLEIN URGED AVOIDANCE OF ANY SUCH CHALLENGE. HE AGREED THERE COULD BE NO AMENDMENTS IN ANY FORM TO THE NPT. HE NOTED DR. IKLE WOULD HEAD U.S. DEL. THOMSON SAID UK HAD NOT WORKED OUT WHICH STATES SHOULD FILL ALL SECONDARY CONFERENCE OFFICES, BUT DID NOT FORESEE ANY PROBLEM. HE NOTED ENNALS (MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS) WOULD HEAD UK DEL. OF ABOUT 10 PEOPLE. THERE WAS AGREEMENT THERE SHOULD BE NO FOLLOW-UP MECHANISM TO REVCON.

6. DISCUSSION TURNED TO TREATY ARTICLE BY ARTICLE CONSIDERATION OF ISSUES LIKELY TO ARISE AND HOW EACH SIDE
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PLANNED TO DEAL WITH THEM. MOST NOTABLE POINTS IN THIS DISCUSSION OUTLINED BELOW.

7. ARTICLE VI - ISRAELYAN SAID MOST COUNTRIES WOULD FOCUS ON THIS AREA AND NWS SHOULD EMPHASIZE MANY POSITIVE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS SINCE 1970. THOMSON NOTED SOME OF THE PROPOSALS LIKELY TO BE MADE. THE SWEDES AND CANADIANS WERE LIKELY TO SEEK A ROLE FOR ADDITIONAL COUNTRIES IN TTB VERIFICATION. IN ADDITION, THE MEXICANS WERE CIRCULATING IN GENEVA A DRAFT PROTOCOL CALLING FOR CTB DEADLINE. THERE MIGHT ALSO BE PROPOSAL FOR ANNOUNCEMENT OF WEAPONS TESTS IN ADVANCE AND CALL FOR COMMITMENT TO NEGOTIATE REDUCTIONS IN SALT. ISRAELYAN NOTED REGARDING TTB IT SHOULD BE ARGUED THAT NEGOTIATIONS WERE NOT SUBJECT OF REVCON, THAT PREMATURE TO SPEAK OF THIRD PARTY INVOLVEMENT IN VIEW OF FACT NEGOTIATIONS STILL IN PROGRESS, AND, IN ANY CASE, THERE WAS NO NEED FOR MONITORING BY ADDITIONAL PARTIES. ALL SIDES AGREED A CTB DEADLINE WAS UNWORKABLE. KLEIN AND ISRAELYAN AGREED THAT ON REDUCTIONS IN SALT, WE WOULD NOT GO BEYOND VLADIVOSTOK STATEMENT AND PUBLIC RECORD FLOWING FROM IT.

8. THOMSON INDICATED UK PLANNING FOR LARGELY TACTICAL REASONS TO SUGGEST IN REVCON FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF QUOTA ON NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS, CITING PROVISION IN TTB TO EFFECT NUCLEAR TESTS WOULD BE KEPT TO MINIMUM AND THAT UK NEEDS SOMETHING TO MATCH SALT ACCOMPLISHMENTS. UK RECOGNIZED DIFFICULTIES WITH QTB AND WOULD ONLY GO SO FAR AS TO MENTION WORD "QUOTA" (I.E. NOT "QTB" PER SE) AND POSSIBLY TO REFER TO 1968 UK PROPOSAL. U.S. AND USSR TOOK NEGATIVE POSITION ON RAISING QUOTA. ISRAELYAN SAID EXISTING STATEMENTS ON LIMITATION TESTS WERE ADEQUATE. TIME WAS NOT RIGHT FOR QUOTA PROPOSAL AND, IN ANY CASE, SUCH A GENERAL APPROACH WAS INFEASIBLE. THOMSON RETREATED SOMEWHAT, BUT NOTED CONCERN THAT SOMEONE ELSE WOULD

RAISE QUOTA ANYWAY AND GET CREDIT FOR IT.

9. ARTICLE VII AND SECURITY ASSURANCES - SOVIET DEL.
INDICATED SOVIETS MIGHT SUGGEST THAT UNSC SHOULD MAKE
THEIR UNGA RESOLUTION ON NON-USE OF FORCE BINDING ON ALL
UN MEMBERS. UK AND U.S. DELS. SAID THIS WOULD CAUSE
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THEM OBVIOUS DIFFICULTIES. THOMSON INDICATED UK THINKING
OF STRESSING VALUE OF NFZ'S. ISRAELYAN SAID THE USSR
FAVORED NFZ'S PROVIDED NO NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE IN THE
TERRITORIES OF THE COUNTRIES INVOLVED. THE THREE SIDES
AGREED ON STRESSING POSITION THAT NPT STRENGTHENS INTER-
NATIONAL SECURITY. EDMONDS REFERRED TO INTEREST EXPRESS-
ED BY JAPAN, PAKISTAN AND YUGOSLAVIA IN POSITIVE ASSUR-
ANCES, BUT GAVE NO SPECIFICS. UK PROPOSED TO SAY THAT
REVCON NOT PROPER FORUM FOR RAISING SUCH SECURITY ASSUR-
ANCES. ISRAELYAN DID NOT FEEL THIS WOULD BE MAJOR ISSUE.
IN ANY CASE THERE WAS EXISTING MECHANISM IN FORM OF
TRILATERAL ASSURANCES PROVIDED IN 1968. VAN DOREN NOTED
CONTEXT OF THOSE ASSURANCES HAD CHANGED, INASMUCH AS PRC
NOW A MEMBER OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. THE THREE SIDES
AGREED THERE WAS LITTLE MORE THAT COULD BE DONE IN THIS
AREA AND THAT IT WOULD NOT BE DESIRABLE TO TABLE A JOINT
PAPER.

10. ARTICLES I AND II - THOMSON SAID DEPOSITARY COUNT-
RIES SHOULD STRESS THAT THESE ARTICLES ARE HEART OF NPT,
THAT PROLIFERATION PROBLEM MORE ACUTE THAN FORMERLY AND
THAT ALL STATES HAVE COMMON INTEREST IN NON-PROLIFERATION.
BEST WAY TO STRENGTHEN TREATY WOULD BE TO GET ADDITIONAL
RATIFICATIONS. HE SAID DISCRIMINATORY NATURE OF TREATY
WOULD BE EMPHASIZED BY NNWS AND THE DEPOSITARIES SHOULD
CONTENTEND THAT EXISTENCE OF NWS RECOGNIZED BY NPT AND
UNDERSTOOD BY ALL PARTIES INITIALLY. THREE DELS. AGREED

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DEPOSITARY COUNTRIES SHOULD NOT BE AT ALL APOLOGETIC OR
DEFENSIVE IN REVCON ABOUT TREATY OR RECORD OF NWS.

11. ARTICLE III - ISRAELYAN READ A STATEMENT TO THE
EFFECT THAT THE NEGOTIATION OF SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS
SHOULD BE SPEEDED UP AND THERE SHOULD BE MORE MEMBERS IN
THE NUCLEAR EXPORTERS COMMITTEE (HE NOTED CZECHOSLOVAKIA
PLANNED TO JOIN LATTER BEFORE THE REVCON.). THE STATE-
MENT ALSO BACKED THE GOV 1621 CONCEPTS (ON DURATION OF
SAFEGUARDS) AND CALLED FOR ADEQUATE PHYSICAL SECURITY ON
NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND FACILITIES. THOMSON SAID MAIN
SAFEGUARDS ISSUE LIKELY TO ARISE WAS DEMAND BY SWEDEN
AND OTHERS THAT NPT SUPPLIERS REQUIRE INFCIRCA/153 SAFE-
GUARDS ON ALL NNWS RECIPIENTS. THE PROBLEM OF NON-NPT
SUPPLIERS UNDERCUTTING NPT SUPPLIERS WAS RAISED IN THIS
REGARD. IT WAS AGREED THAT THERE SHOULD BE FURTHER
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DISCUSSIONS ON THIS MATTER AFTER THE SUPPLIERS' EXPLORA-
TORY MEETING.

12. ARTICLE IV - SOVIETS POINTED OUT NUCLEAR TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE TO DEVELOPING STATES, INCLUDING USSR CONTRI-
BUTION, HAD INCREASED CONSIDERABLY SINCE NPT ENTERED INTO
FORCE. PROBLEM WAS THAT MUCH OF THIS ASSISTANCE WENT TO

NON-PARTIES. SOVIETS WERE PREPARED TO HAVE REVCON ADOPT A RECOMMENDATION THAT FUTURE ASSISTANCE SHOULD GO TO PARTIES ON A PREFERENTIAL BASIS. U.S. DEL. NOTED U.S. WOULD MAKE IN-KIND CONTRIBUTIONS TO IAEA OPERATIONAL BUDGET IN 1975 BEYOND REGULAR LEVEL OF U.S. VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTION AND THAT U.S. HAD ALREADY ANNOUNCED THAT FUTURE U.S. IN-KIND CONTRIBUTIONS TO IAEA TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM WOULD BE ALLOCATED ON PREFERENTIAL BASIS TO NPT PARTIES.

13. ARTICLE V - MOST OF ARTICLE V DISCUSSION FOCUSED ON PERSISTENT UK EFFORTS TO PERSUADE USSR DEL. TO AGREE TO SUPPORT UK PROPOSAL FOR PNE COMMITTEE IN IAEA, WITH RESULTS REPORTED SEPTEL. THE SOVIETS ARGUED THAT UK EXAGGERATED THE RISK OF UNMANAGEABLE PRESSURES AT REVCON FOR FURTHER PNE MACHINERY, AND THAT TACTICAL PURPOSE OF THE PROPOSED COMMITTEE WOULD BE LOST IF ESTABLISHED ON EVE OF CONFERENCE (WHICH LOOKED LIKE A GIMMICK) RATHER THAN IN RESPONSE TO PRESSURES SHOULD THEY DEVELOP. IN FORMAL SESSIONS TIMERBAEV CONFIDED SOVIET CONCERN THAT U.S. AND USSR WOULD BE UNDER ADDITIONAL PRESSURE ON PNE'S IF UK COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED. USSR WISHED TO KEEP PNE MULTILATERAL DISCUSSIONS AT TECHNICAL LEVEL. EDMONDS INDICATED IN FORMAL SESSIONS HE SPOKE ON BEHALF OF THE SEVERAL CO-SPONSORS OF UK RESOLUTION, BUT FURTHERST UK DEL. COULD PUSH USSR DEL. WAS TO AGREE NOT TO OPPOSE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PNE COMMITTEE DURING THE REVCON IF OTHERS SUPPORTED IT THEN.

14. USSR DEL. INDICATED SOVIETS HAD DECIDED TO TAKE POSITION AT REVCON THAT NON-PARTIES AS WELL AS PARTIES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS CANDIDATES FOR PNE SERVICES FROM NWS UNDER APPROPRIATE IAEA CONTROLS. KLEIN AGREED IN PRINCIPLE WITH THIS POSITION AND THOMSON WELCOMED IT. CONFIDENTIAL

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ISRAELYAN SAID THAT, IN GENERAL, THE DEPOSITARIES SHOULD BE PREPARED TO COUNTER ALLEGATIONS THEY HAD NOT MET THEIR ARTICLE V OBLIGATIONS. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE SHOULD EMPHASIZE THE IAEA ROLE IN PNE FIELD AND THE FACT THAT THERE WAS STILL PREPARATORY WORK ON PNE'S REQUIRED. FYI U.S. DEL. INFORMALLY RAISED WITH TIMERBAEV QUESTION OF USSR POSITION ON PNE SERVICES REDUCED TO PRACTICE IN VIEW OF ERICSSON PAPER, WHICH IS NOW A REVCON DOCUMENT. TIMERBAEV AT FIRST CLAIMED NOT TO HAVE SEEN FINAL VERSION OF ERICSSON PAPER, BUT LATER HINTED THAT SOVIET POSTURE ON THIS MATTER WOULD BE LOW-KEY ALTHOUGH THEY WOULD NOT DENY VALIDITY OF ERICSSON PAPER STATEMENTS. WHEN ASKED WHAT SOVIETS WOULD DO IF REQUESTED BY A PARTY TO FURNISH PNE SERVICES OF THESE TYPES, HE SAID SUCH A REQUEST

WOULD FIRST LEAD TO STUDIES OF FEASIBILITY, SAFETY, ETC.,
ACKNOWLEDGING THAT MANY PROBLEMS WOULD HAVE TO BE SOLVED.
END FYI.

RICHARDSON

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